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"IN A CATEGORY OF ITS OWN":
THE SUPREME COURT IN SAFFORD V.
REDDING OFFERS SCHOOLCHILDREN
LITTLE PROTECTION IN PLACING LIMITS
ON STUDENT STRIP SEARCHES
GEORGE M. DERY III*
I. INTRODUCTION.
The Supreme Court, in Safford Unified School District # 1 v.
Redding, held that middle school officials, in forcing a 13 year-
old girl to partially expose her breasts and pelvic area during a
strip search for ibuprofen and naproxen pills, violated the stu-
dent's Fourth Amendment rights.1 Many parents might consider
the prospect of school officials strip searching their middle-
schooler for prescription-strength Advil and over-the-counter
Aleve to be shocking. Where, they might wonder, did a school
vice principal ever get the idea that forcing an adolescent to
shake her bra and underwear in front of school officials,2 with-
* Professor, California State University Fullerton, Division of Politics, Ad-
ministration, and Justice; former Deputy District Attorney, Los Angeles, Cal-
ifornia; J.D. 1987, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. 1983, University of
California Los Angeles.
1 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. # 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 2637 (2009). The
Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1, 531 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir.
2008).
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out giving prior notice to, or receiving permission from, her par-
ents,3 would be considered reasonable?
School officials, the parents might be alarmed to learn, got the
notion for such intrusions from interpreting Supreme Court pre-
cedent. In a series of cases, beginning with a search of a stu-
dent's purse for cigarettes, the Court has increasingly broadened
school officials' search powers over children.4 In cases involving
searches of articles students bring on campus, and even of the
contents of the children's own bodies, the Court has developed
and expanded upon the idea that a public schoolchild has a spe-
cial relationship to the state. In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Court
has declared that "the preservation of order and a proper educa-
tional environment requires close supervision of school children,
as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that would
be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult." 5 In
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, the Court announced that
"for many purposes 'school authorities act in loco parentis' with
the power and indeed the duty to 'inculcate the habits and man-
ners of civility.'"6 Finally, in Board of Education v. Earls, the
Court deemed a school official to be acting as "guardian and
tutor," thus making the relevant Fourth Amendment issue
"whether the search is one that a reasonable guardian and tutor
might undertake." 7 Thus, in less than three decades, the Court
had gone from upholding a vice principal's search of a student's
purse 8 to promoting as reasonable a faculty's monitoring, han-
dling and checking for temperature a schoolchild's urine
sample. 9
3 Id. at 1083.
4 See generally New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1984); Vernonia Sch.
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822
(2002).
5 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339.
6 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655.
7 Earls, 536 U.S. at 830.
8 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 347.
9 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 650, 664-65; Earls, 536 U.S. at 2566.
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This Article begins with a review of the history of special
needs doctrine in the context of public schools in Part II. Part III
presents Safford: its factual background, lower court analysis
and Supreme Court decision. Finally, Part IV critically examines
the implications of the Court's ruling in Safford.
H. REVIEW OF SPECIAL NEEDS SEARCHES
OF SCHOOLCHILDREN.
At the outset of its analysis in Safford, the Court noted that
Fourth Amendment reasonableness "generally requires a law
enforcement officer to have probable cause for conducting a
search."10 Such a rule has a long history. In Carroll v. United
States, a case occurring during the prohibition era, the Court
ruled, "On reason and authority the true rule is that if the search
and seizure... are made upon probable cause... the search and
seizure are valid."" Chambers v. Maroney employed even
stronger language, declaring, "In enforcing the Fourth Amend-
ment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures,
the Court has insisted upon probable cause as a minimum re-
quirement for a reasonable search permitted by the Constitu-
tion."'12 Brinegar v. United States saw probable cause as a "long-
prevailing standard" which sought to "safeguard citizens from
rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from un-
founded charges of crime," while at the same time seeking to
"give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's pro-
tection."13 Probable cause thus protected individuals from an
"officer's whim or caprice" without unduly hampering police. 14
When it came to schoolchildren smoking in the bathroom,
however, the Court no longer trusted in probable cause to strike
10 Safford, 129 S. Ct.at 2639.
11 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
12 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
13 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
14 Id.
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the proper balance of interests. 15 In New Jersey v. T.L.O., a
teacher, catching T.L.O., a 14-year-old, and another girl smok-
ing in the lavatory in violation of school rules, marched the trou-
blemakers to the office of Assistant Vice Principal Theodore
Choplick.16 T.L.O. denied ever smoking despite the teacher's ac-
cusation and her smoking companion's confession.17 Mr.
Choplick responded by opening T.L.O.'s purse and finding ciga-
rettes, the recovery of which led him to discover marijuana and
evidence of use and dealing. 18 When the state brought delin-
quency charges against her, T.L.O. unsuccessfully sought to
have the evidence found in her purse suppressed as obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.' 9
Justice White, who authored the Court's opinion, saw the case
as presenting the question of how "should we strike a balance
between the schoolchild's legitimate expectations of privacy and
the school's equally legitimate need to maintain an environment
in which learning can take place?" 20 In answer, T.L. 0. first dis-
pensed with any requirement that school officials seek a warrant
as unduly interfering with the school's need to maintain disci-
pline.21 The Court then found the school setting necessitated
"some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity
needed to justify a search." 22 Although recognizing that, ordina-
rily, a search must be based on probable cause, Justice White
determined that probable cause was "not an irreducible require-
ment of a valid search." 23 Instead, when "a careful balancing of
governmental and private interests suggests that the public in-
terest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of rea-
15 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328, 341.
16 Id. at 328.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 329.
20 Id. at 340.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
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sonableness that stops short of probable cause," the Court has
adopted a lesser standard.24 T.L. 0. therefore concluded that the
need "for freedom to maintain order in the schools" required
downgrading the standard for searching a student's purse from
probable cause to assessing simply the "reasonableness, under
all of the circumstances, of the search." 25
The reasonableness of school searches involved a two-part in-
quiry: first, whether the search was "justified at its inception,"
and second, whether the search was reasonably limited in
scope. 26 To satisfy the first part of the test, the Court considered
whether Mr. Choplick had "reasonable grounds for suspecting"
that the search would turn up evidence of a violation of school
rules or criminal law.27 The inquiry's second "scope" portion
was judged by assessing whether the assistant vice principal's ac-
tions were "reasonably related to the objectives of the search
and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the
student and the nature of the infraction." 28 The Court found, by
carefully sifting through the facts, that Mr. Choplick did indeed
possess reasonable suspicion when he searched T.L.O.'s purse.29
Likewise, T.L.O. methodically retraced each of Mr. Choplick's
steps to ensure that his search of the entire purse was reasonable
in scope. 30 The Court in T.L.O., therefore, even when stripping
students of the right to probable cause, still demanded diligent
inquiries into individualized suspicion regarding the reason for
and scope of school searches.
Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence, noted that the Court
had dispensed with probable cause in T.L.O. due to a "special
law enforcement need for greater flexibility."31 A majority of
24 Id. at 341.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 341-42.
28 Id. at 342.
29 Id. at 345-46.
30 Id. at 347.
31 Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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the Court subsequently labeled T.L.0. as a "special needs"
case.32 Indeed, the Court later cited T.L. 0. in support of its as-
sertion that it has found "'special needs' to exist in the public
school context," 33 and that "'special needs' inhere in the public
school context."3 An assistant vice principal's investigation of
smoking in the bathroom thus brought the doctrine of special
needs to schools.
T.L.O.'s requirement for individualized suspicion would not
survive the Court's next special needs school case, Vernonia
School District 47J v. Acton.35 In Vernonia, school officials in a
small Oregon town became alarmed at "a sharp increase in drug
use" which coincided with disciplinary problems, such as rude-
ness in class, outbursts of profanity and the glamorizing of drug
and alcohol use. 36 Student athletes, "admired in their schools,"
became "leaders of the drug culture." 37 School coaches wit-
nessed "omissions of safety procedures and misexecutions" by
players, some resulting in physical injury.38 The school district
implemented a "Student Athlete Drug Policy" in which all stu-
dents wishing to participate in school sports had to submit to
suspicion-less drug testing.39 Officials mandated blanket testing
of all students at the beginning of the sport's season as well as
random testing of ten percent of athletes each week.40 Each test
necessitated that students provide a urine sample while a faculty
monitor of the same gender listened for sounds of urination.41
The student then gave the sample to the teacher, who, after
checking for temperature and tampering, transferred it to a vial,
32 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1988); Grif-
fin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987).
33 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653.
34 Earls, 536 U.S. at 829.
35 Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
36 Id. at 648-49.
37 Id. at 648, 649.
38 Id. at 649.
39 Id. at 650.
40 Id.
41 Id.
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which was sent out for drug testing.42 James Acton, in the sev-
enth grade at one of the District's grade schools, was denied
participation in football when he and his parents refused to sign
the drug test consent forms. 43 He filed suit, claiming the testing
scheme violated the Fourth Amendment.44
The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, readily rec-
ognized Vernonia as presenting a situation of "special needs, be-
yond the normal need for law enforcement." 45 Thus, as it had in
its prior special needs case, TL.O., the Court in Vernonia dis-
pensed with the warrant and probable cause requirements as
"impracticable."46 Vernonia, however, went beyond T.L.O., for
it disposed not only of probable cause, but also of any individu-
alized suspicion whatsoever. In upholding drug urinalysis of all
students based on no factual justification, Justice Scalia saw the
Court as doing individual students a favor. Suspicion-less testing
of children avoided the "badge of shame" that came with testing
based on individualized suspicion.47 Furthermore, drug testing
every student prevented teachers from abusing the tests by im-
posing it arbitrarily "upon troublesome but not drug-likely
students."48
In place of the traditional measures, Vernonia assessed rea-
sonableness "by balancing [the drug test's] intrusion on the indi-
vidual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of
legitimate governmental interests." 49 Balancing in the school
context, however, became rather complex. On the individual
student's side of the balance, the Court weighed the school-
child's "decreased expectation of privacy" and "the relative un-
42 Id.
43 Id. at 651.
44Id.
45 Id. at 653.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 663.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 652-53.
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obtrusiveness of the search." 50 On the government's side of the
scales, the Court considered the "severity of need met by the
search." 51 Also included in the mix was the "most significant ele-
ment" of the government's role as "guardian and tutor of chil-
dren entrusted to its care." 52
When considering student interests, Justice Scalia found any
invasion of privacy to be insignificant. 53 School authorities exer-
cised a "tutelary responsibility for children," and thus routinely
intruded on privacy by subjecting students to such invasions as
physical exams and vaccinations. 54 Further, declaring that,
"school sports are not for the bashful," Vernonia noted that stu-
dent athletes, undressing in locker rooms, enjoyed even less pri-
vacy expectations.55 The Court then considered the character of
intrusion imposed by urinalysis. Finding the process of providing
the sample to be "identical to those typically encountered in
public restrooms," Vernonia deemed any privacy interests com-
promised to be "negligible." 56
The Court viewed the government's interests quite differ-
ently. The "severity of the need met by the search" 57 was itself
broken down into three components: 1) the nature of the gov-
ernment concern; 2) the immediacy of the government concern;
and 3) the efficacy of the government means for meeting the
concern.58 For the first component regarding the "nature" of the
government concern, Justice Scalia deemed "deterring drug use
by our Nation's schoolchildren" to be at least as important as
enforcing laws against drug importation and deterring drug use
by train engineers, government concerns previously accepted by
50 Id. at 664.
51 Id. at 664-65.
52 Id. at 665.
53 Id. at 660.
54 Id. at 656.
55 Id. at 657.
56 Id. at 658.
57 Id. at 664-65.
58 Id. at 660.
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the Court.59 As for the second element pertaining to the "imme-
diacy" of the government's concern, Vernonia was satisfied by
the District's assertion that "a large segment of the student
body" was in "a state of rebellion." 60 Regarding the third ele-
ment, the program's efficacy, the Court found it "self-evident
that a drug problem largely fueled by the 'role model' effect of
athletes' drug use... is effectively addressed by making sure that
athletes do not use drugs." 61 Thus, the government interests out-
weighed the individual privacy intrusions, leading the Court to
find suspicion-less drug testing of schoolchildren to be reasona-
ble under the Fourth Amendment. 62
The Court expanded special needs searches of students even
further in Board of Education v. Earls.63 In Earls, the Tecumseh
School District adopted a "Student Activities Drug Testing Pol-
icy," which required urinalysis of any student wishing to partici-
pate "in any extracurricular activity."64 Activities covered by the
mandate included "the Academic Team, Future Farmers of
America, Future Homemakers of America, band, choir, pom
pon, cheerleading and athletics." 65 Students Lindsay Earls and
Daniel James sued the school district, contending that the drug
policy violated the Fourth Amendment. 66
In an opinion written by Justice Thomas, the Court in Earls
explicitly followed Vernonia's guidelines to find the Tecumseh
School District's drug testing reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.67 In balancing "the intrusion on the children's
Fourth Amendment rights against the promotion of legitimate
59 Id. at 661.
60 Id. at 662-63.
61 Id. at 663.
62 Id. at 664-65.
63 Earls, 536 U.S. at 822.
64 Id. at 825, 826.
65 Id. at 826.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 830. Indeed, by the time of Earls, special needs had become so ac-
cepted that Justice Thomas pigeonholed "the probable cause standard" as
"peculiarly related to criminal investigations." Id.
Volume 5, Number 2 Spring 2012
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governmental interests," the Earls Court emphasized that "the
context of the public school environment serves as the backdrop
for the analysis of the privacy interest at stake." 68 Since the drug
tests' "subjects" were children who had been "committed to the
temporary custody of the State as schoolmaster," Justice
Thomas deemed the privacy interest as "limited." 69 The fact that
the children in non-athletic extracurricular activities did not par-
ticipate in Vernonia's "regular physicals and communal undress"
did not affect the Court's calculus, because such a distinction
was deemed "not essential."70
After concluding that the students had a limited expectation
of privacy, Earls considered the "character of intrusion" im-
posed by mandatory urinalysis of students.71 Finding the testing
procedure to be "virtually identical" to the one approved in
Vernonia, the Earls Court deemed the intrusion to be "negligi-
ble"72 and "not significant." 73 On the school's side of the scales,
Justice Thomas found the government's concerns important be-
cause "the nationwide drug epidemic makes the war against
drugs a pressing concern in every school." 74 Upon balancing the
interests, Earls concluded that the mandatory suspicion-less
urinalysis was "entirely reasonable." 75 Thus, the case law on the
eve of Safford consistently supported searches of students that
extended to required collection of biological samples. Further,
the precedent had repeatedly found that the danger of drugs to
the nation's youth allowed searches even in the absence of sus-
picion of wrongdoing.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 831.
71 Id. at 832.
72 Id. at 832, 833.
73 Id. at 834.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 836.
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I. SAFFORD V. REDDING.
A. Facts.
In Safford, school officials, believing that 13-year-old Savana
Redding had brought "forbidden prescription and over-the-
counter drugs to school," subjected her to a strip search.76 Saf-
ford was "a small community of slightly under 10,000 re-
sidents. . .nestled next to the Pinaleno Mountains in
southeastern Arizona." 77 Despite its bucolic setting, Safford
Unified School District found "itself on the front lines of a de-
cades-long war against drug abuse among students." 78 The assis-
tant principal of Safford Middle School, Kerry Wilson, stated in
an affidavit that "a couple of years" prior to Savana's strip
search, "a student brought a prescription drug to school and be-
gan handing the pills out to several of her classmates." 79 The
student had an adverse reaction to the drug that was almost fatal
and had to be airlifted to Tucson for intensive care.80 School of-
ficials therefore developed a policy which strictly prohibited
"the nonmedical use, possession, or sale of any drug on school
grounds, including 'any prescription or over-the-counter
drug."'81
School officials first became concerned about Savana in par-
ticular at an August 22, 2003 school dance held to celebrate the
start of the academic year.82 Staff at the dance noticed "some
unusually rowdy behavior from a small group of students, in-
cluding Marissa Glines and Savana Redding, and detected the
76 Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2637.
77 Redding, 531 F.3d at 1074.
78 Brief for Petitioner at 4, Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding,
129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009)(No. 08-479)[hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
79 Brief for Petitioner Joint Appendix at 10a. The gender of this student is
not clear from the record, for Wilson referred to the schoolchild as both
"her" and "he." Id.
80 Id.
81 Safford, S. Ct.. at 2639-40.
82 Redding, 531 F.3d at 1075.
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smell of alcohol among them." 83 Before the dance was over,
staff discovered alcohol and cigarettes in the girls' bathroom.84
Some weeks after the dance, another student, Jordan Romero,85
told Principal Robert Beeman and Assistant Principal Wilson
that "certain students were bringing drugs and weapons on cam-
pus." 86 Jordan's mother reported that her son had ingested pills
he had received from a classmate and later became "violent and
gotten sick to his stomach."87 Jordan said that Savana had
"hosted a party at her camper trailer before the August 22
dance," at which "Savana served alcohol-Jack Daniels, Black
Velvet, vodka, and tequila," bought by Savana's mother from
Thrifty's Food and Drug.88
A week later, on October 8, 2003, Jordan handed Assistant
Principal Wilson a white pill he said he had received from
Marissa Glines89 and said that "a group of students was planning
on taking the pills at lunch."90 School nurse Peggy Schwallier
identified the pill as prescription strength Ibuprofen 400mg. 91
Wilson then called Marissa out of class.92 Just outside of class,
Mr. Johnson, Marissa's teacher, handed Wilson a black day
83 Brief for Petitioner Joint Appendix at 10a.
84 Id.
85 As noted by the Safford Court, there was "no relation" between the stu-
dent, Jordan Romero, and the administrative assistant, Ms. Romero. Safford,
129 S. Ct. at 2640.
86 Id.
87 Redding, 531 F.3d at 1076.
88 Brief for Petitioner Joint Appendix at 8a. The facts conflict regarding
Principal Beeman's follow up on these revelations. Beeman asserted that,
"Within a day or two, I had contacted all the students' parents. In Savana's
case, her mom simply dismissed the account by saying that Savana would not
have been involved." Id. In contrast, Savana contended that, in a meeting
after the strip search, "Mr. Beeman raised some events and stories he had
heard about me. My mother asked why she had not been called regarding the
alleged prior incidents. Mr. Beeman said he could not reach her." Id. at 26a.
89 Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2640.
90 Brief for Petitioner Joint Appendix at 11a.
91 Id. at 12a.
92 Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2640.
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planner, which contained such contraband as knives, a cigarette,
and lighters.93 In the presence of administrative assistant Helen
Romero, Wilson asked Marissa to empty her pockets and wallet,
recovering a blue pill, several white pills and a razor blade.94
Nurse Schwallier learned from the poison control hotline that
the blue pill was "a 200 mg dose of an anti-inflammatory drug,
generically called naproxen, available over the counter." 95 When
Wilson questioned Marissa about the source of the blue pill, she
responded, "I guess it slipped in when she gave me the IBU
400s." When asked who "she" was, Marissa replied, "Savana
Redding." 96 Further, Marissa denied knowing anything about
the contents of the day planner recovered from the desk next to
her.97 No follow up questions were asked about when Marissa
obtained the pills from Savana, the likelihood that Savana cur-
rently possessed pills or where she might be hiding them.98 Wil-
son had Schwallier and Romero search Marissa's bra and
underpants; this search recovered no more pills. 99
At about this time, Wilson called Savana out of class and con-
fronted her with the contents of the day planner. 10° Although
Savana confirmed that the planner was hers, she denied know-
ing anything about its contents, having loaned it to Marissa a
few days earlier.101 Wilson then showed Savana the pills she had
received from Jordan and Marissa and asked her if she knew
anything about them.102 When Savana answered that she did
not, Wilson told her she had heard that Savana was "giving
these pills to fellow students. ' 10 3 Savana denied this accusation
93 Brief for Petitioner Joint Appendix at 12a.
94 Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2640; Brief for Petitioner Joint Appendix at 18a.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id; Brief for Petitioner Joint Appendix at 12a.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 2640-41; Brief for Petitioner Joint Appendix at 13a.
101 Id at 2641; Brief for Petitioner Joint Appendix at 14a.
102 Id. at 2638; Id.
103 Id.
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and agreed to have her belongings searched.10 A search of
Savana's backpack uncovered nothing.105 Savana described the
subsequent strip search of her as follows:
I went to the nurse's office. Mrs. Romero asked
me to remove my jacket, socks, and shoes. The
school nurse, Mrs. Schwallier was in the bathroom
washing her hands. When the (sic) Mrs. Schwallier
came out they told me to remove my pants and
shirt. . .I took off my clothes while they both
watched. Mrs. Romero searched the pants and
shirt and found nothing. . .Then they asked me to
pull my bra out and to the side and shake it, ex-
posing my breasts. Then they asked me to pull out
my underwear and shake it. They also told me to
pull the underwear out at the crotch and shake it,
exposing my pelvic area.106
No pills were found in the search.107
Savana, an honor role student who, prior to this incident, had
never been disciplined while at Safford, asserted that "[t]he strip
search was the most humiliating experience I have ever had."10 8
Savana reported that "Mrs. Romero and Mrs. Schwallier did not
look away while I was taking off my clothes," and "did nothing
to respect my privacy."'1 9 Savana explained, "I was embarrassed
and scared, but I felt I would be in more trouble if I did not do
what they asked. I held my head down so that they could not see
that I was about to cry."110 Savana's mother sued the Safford
Unified School District, "for conducting a strip search in viola-
tion of Savana's Fourth Amendment rights.""'
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Brief for Petitioner Joint Appendix at 23a.
107 Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2638.
108 Brief for Petitioner Joint Appendix at 21a, 25a.
109 Id.
110 Id. 24a.
111 Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2638.
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B. The Lower Courts.
In district court, the defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment, relying "solely on the arguments that the strip search
did not violate Savana's Fourth Amendment rights, and because
there was no constitutional violation, no further inquiry is neces-
sary."' 12 The district court found no Fourth Amendment viola-
tion, because it determined that the search was both justified at
its inception and reasonably related in scope to its objectives. u3
Savana's loan to Marissa of her day planner "provided a suffi-
cient nexus between the two girls to corroborate Marissa's tip,"
thus providing school officials with reasonable grounds for sus-
pecting "that a strip search of Savana would turn up
ibuprofen."114 As for the intrusiveness of the search, the "need
to locate the ibuprofen was sufficiently urgent that the strip
search was 'reasonably related' to the search's objective and was
not 'excessively intrusive. "115 The district court therefore deter-
mined that the strip search satisfied T.L.O.'s two-pronged test.
A divided Court of Appeals upheld the grant of summary
judgment, finding "ample facts" justifying the search at the out-
set and a "'strong interest' in protecting students from prescrip-
tion drugs" supporting the scope of the strip search. 116 When the
case was reheard en banc, however, the court assessed the bal-
ance of interests dramatically differently, concluding, "The pub-
lic school officials who strip searched Savana acted contrary to
all reason and common sense as they trampled over her legiti-
mate and substantial interests in privacy and security of her per-
son. "117 Justice Wardlaw, who wrote the court's opinion, noted
that, "Nowhere does the T.L.O. Court tell us to accord school
officials' judgments unblinking deference" nor would a "genera-
112 Redding, 531 F.3d at 1077.
113 Id. at 1077-78.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 1078.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 1080, 1081-87.
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lized drug problem" provide "blanket approval of strip searches
of thirteen-year-olds."'1 8 Redding also emphasized the degree of
the intrusion, declaring, "Let there be no doubt: the Safford
school officials conducted a strip search of Savana."11 9 Finally,
acknowledging that "reasonableness, of course, depends on con-
text," Justice Wardlaw set up a novel sliding scale for determin-
ing "reasonable suspicion."120 Redding explained:
T.L.O. requires that "as the intrusiveness of the search of a
student intensifies, so too does the standard of Fourth Amend-
ment reasonableness. What may constitute reasonable suspicion
for a search of a locker or even a pocket or pocketbook may fall
well short of reasonableness for a nude search." 121
Redding then turned to T.L.O.'s first inquiry-whether the
search was justified at its inception-and found the evidence for
such justification wanting.122 In contrast to T.L.O., where fur-
ther intrusion inside the student's purse was based on the "phys-
ical evidence" of cigarettes and rolling papers, no such "causal
link" existed in Redding, where "the initial search of Savana re-
vealed nothing to suggest she possessed pills or that she was an-
ything less than truthful when she emphatically stated she had
never brought pills into the school."1 23 Instead, the "primary
purported justification" for Savana's strip search was Marissa's
"self serving statement, which shifted the culpability for bringing
the pills to school from Marissa to Savana."'1 24 Courts, which
typically give such accomplice statements little weight, should be
particularly suspicious of an assertion made by "a frightened
118 Id. at 1080.
119 Id. The Court clarified that "Savana did not have to be completely naked
for the school officials to have strip searched her." Id. Several state statutes
defining strip searches consider a strip search to have occurred when "some
or all" of the clothing is removed. Id. (emphasis in original).
120 Id. at 1081.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1082.
124 Id.
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eighth grader caught red-handed by a principal."125 More doubt
should have been raised when the accused neither was previ-
ously tied to contraband nor suffered any "disciplinary history
whatsoever at the school." 126 Basing the search on Savana's ad-
mission that she had loaned the day planner to Marissa was
"nothing more than guilt-by-association."' 127 Instead of con-
ducting additional investigation, such as speaking with Savana's
teachers, parents or fellow students, school officials subjected
Savana to a "demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliat-
ing, terrifying, unpleasant [and] embarrassing" search.12 8 The
Redding Court therefore held that "the strip search of Savana
was unjustified at its inception."129
Redding next considered whether the strip search was reason-
able in scope, keeping in mind T.L.O.'s requirement that the
search be "not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of
the student and the nature of the infraction."130 The Court deter-
mined that "school authorities adopted a disproportionately ex-
treme measure to search a thirteen-year-old girl" for over-the-
counter drugs. 131 The strip search was not reasonably related to
finding ibuprofen, for the "most logical" places had already
been searched to no avail and nothing indicated the pills would
be "hidden under [Savana's] panties or bra." 32 Further, strip
searches, forcing persons to disrobe and expose themselves "for
125 Id. at 1082-83.
126 Id. at 1083.
127 Id. at 1084.
128 Id. at 1083.
129 Id. at 1085. The Court characterized the evidence for the search as based
on "an unsubstantiated tip from Marissa, a student seeking to shift blame
from herself to Savana. Other facts marshaled by the school district-allega-
tions of alcohol use months earlier, Jordan's tip that Marissa provided him
with a pill, and Marissa's hidden contraband in a planner Savana lent her-
are logically unrelated to a reasonable belief that Savana was hiding pills on
her person." Id.
130 Id. at 1085. (emphasis in original).
131 Id.
132 Id. The Court even questioned whether "classmates would be willing to
ingest pills previously stored in [Savana's] underwear." Id.
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visual inspection by a stranger clothed with the uniform and au-
thority of the state," create "psychological trauma" even for
adults, let alone a schoolchild. 133 Justice Wardlaw wondered
aloud, "all this to find prescription-strength ibuprofen pills." 34
Possession of ibuprofen, "an infraction that poses an imminent
danger to no one," could have been handled simply by keeping
Savana in the principal's office or sending her home. 135 The
Court therefore concluded that "the strip search was impermis-
sible in scope" and the school had violated Savana's Fourth
Amendment rights. 136
C. The Safford Case.
Justice Souter, writing for the Safford Court, began his analy-
sis by returning to the Fourth Amendment fundamental of prob-
able cause, noting, "The Fourth Amendment 'right of the people
to be secure in their persons. . .against unreasonable searches
and seizures' generally requires a law enforcement officer to
have probable cause for conducting a search." 137 Safford troub-
led itself to define probable cause,1 38 going so far as to flesh out
the factors to be considered in assessing its "knowledge compo-
nent."1 39 Safford even compared the probable cause's level of
133 Id. at 1085-86.
134 Id. at 1086.
135 Id. at 1085, 1087.
136 Id. at 1087.
137 Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2639.
138 Justice Souter noted that probable cause occurred when "the facts and
circumstances within [an officer's] knowledge and of which [he] has reasona-
bly trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being commit-
ted." Id.
139 Safford determined that the "knowledge component" of probable cause
included an assessment of "the degree to which known facts imply prohibited
conduct," consideration of the "specificity of the information received," and
the "reliability of its source." Id.
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certainty ("substantial chance") with that of reasonable suspi-
cion ("moderate chance.")140
The Court's extended discussion of probable cause was re-
markable, particularly in light of the fact that it was ultimately
not the test employed in the case. Instead, the standard actually
applied to the search of Savana's backpack, outer clothing and
underwear was reasonable suspicion.141 Safford determined that
reasonable suspicion did indeed exist to justify a search of the
backpack and outer clothing, because if "a student is reasonably
suspected of giving out contraband pills, she is reasonably sus-
pected of carrying them on her person and in the carryall that
has become an item of student uniform in most places today."'142
The second intrusion, which involved "Savana's pulling her
underwear away from her body in the presence of the two offi-
cials who were able to see her necessarily exposed breasts and
pelvic area to some degree"-essentially a strip search-raised
entirely different concerns. 43 A strip search required "distinct
elements of justification on the part of school authorities for go-
ing beyond a search of outer clothing and belongings." 144 This
stricter standard was due to the uniqueness of a strip search. The
Court repeatedly distinguished a strip search as "categorically
distinct," 45 "categorically extreme," 46 and "in a category of its
own demanding its own specific suspicions.'1 47 Safford deemed
strip searches as "embarrassing, frightening, and humiliating" as
well as "degrading" and "reserved for wrongdoers." 48 As bad as
it was in general, a strip search could be even worse for vulnera-
140 Id.
141 Id. at 2641.
142 Id.
143 Id. Justice Souter opined, "The exact label for this final step in the intru-
sion is not important, though strip search is a fair way to speak of it." Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 2642.
147 Id. at 2643.
148 Id. at 2641-42.
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ble adolescents, who could suffer "serious emotional
damage."149
The "indignity" of a strip search affected T.L.O.'s inquiry
measuring the reasonableness of an intrusion's scope.150 Safford
reiterated T.L. 0. 's requirement that a search would be permissi-
ble only when it was "not excessively intrusive in light of the age
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction."'151 The
nature of Savana's supposed infraction, possessing "common
pain relievers equivalent to two Advil, or one Aleve," failed to
support the "degree of intrusion."152 School officials knew "the
limited threat of the specific drugs" for which they searched. 153
Furthermore, authorities could not have reasonably suspected
that the "common painkillers [were] in her underwear," because
the only basis for such a search was the asserted generality that
"students.. .hid[e] contraband in or under their clothing." 154 Saf-
ford refused to allow such "general background possibilities" to
support such an extensive search; instead it mandated that offi-
cials have a suspicion that the search "will pay off." This was
lacking, because "nondangerous school contraband does not
raise the specter of stashes in intimate places, and there is no
evidence in the record of any general practice among Safford
Middle School students of hiding that sort of thing in under-
wear."' 155 School administrators did not obtain information from
either Jordan or Marissa that Savana stored pills in her under-
wear, and the search of Marissa's underwear yielded nothing.156
The school simply lacked the "reasonable suspicion of danger or
of resort to underwear for hiding evidence of wrongdoing" re-
quired before a search "can reasonably make the quantum leap
149 Id.
150 Id. at 2642.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 2643.
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from outer clothes and backpacks to exposure of intimate
parts."'157 The strip search of Savana Redding was therefore "un-
reasonable and a violation of the Fourth Amendment."'158
IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT ISSUES RAISED BY SAFFORD.
A. Safford Applied Special Needs in a Fundamentally
Different Way from Prior Special Needs Cases.
1. The Safford Court Realistically Weighed Student Privacy
Interests Rather than Minimizing them.
The Court in Safford assessed student privacy interests in a
dramatically different fashion than it had in previous special
needs cases. In Safford, Justice Souter first considered Savana's
subjective experience of the search, noting that it was "embar-
rassing, frightening, and humiliating."'159 He found her privacy
expectations reasonable by noting the "consistent experiences of
other young people similarly searched, whose adolescent vulner-
ability intensifies the patent offensiveness of the exposure." 60
This "common reaction" demonstrated the "obvious" difference
between a strip search and the "experience of nakedness or near
undress in other school circumstances."161 Indeed, strip searches
are so degrading that some communities have simply banned
them, "no matter what the facts may be."162
157 Id. at 2643. The Court's subsequent discussion of qualified immunity for
school officials is beyond the scope of this Article.
158 Id. at 2644.
159 Id. at 2642.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. The Court might not have come by this realization easily. During oral
arguments, "some... justices minimized the girl's lasting humiliation." Joan
Biskupic, Ginsburg: Court Needs Another Woman, USA TODAY at 1, http:I
usatoday.printhis.clickability.com/pt/cpt?action=cpt&title=Ginsburg %3A+
Court+needs+another=woman. Justice Ginsburg had to alert her fellow jus-
tices to the concerns raised by the situation. "'They have never been a 13-
year-old girl,' she told USA TODAY later when asked about her colleagues'
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The seriousness which Safford gave to student privacy con-
cerns contrasted sharply with the Court's prior attitude in spe-
cial needs precedent. In Vernonia, the Court declared that
"students within the school environment have a lesser expecta-
tion of privacy than members of the population generally. 63
When weighing schoolchildren's privacy expectations, Justice
Scalia considered the criminal probationer's "relationship with
the State" to be a relevant analogue. 164 He noted, "Although a
'probationer's home, like anyone else's, is protected by the
Fourth Amendment,' the supervisory relationship between pro-
bationer and State justifies 'a degree of impingement upon [a
probationer's] privacy that would not be constitutional if applied
to the public at large." 165 Likewise, Vernonia involved "sub-
jects" who had been "committed to the temporary custody of
the State."'166 Vernonia considered school authorities to act in
loco parentis, duty bound to instill in students certain habits and
manners. 167 For support, he approvingly cited cases that upheld
censorship of school-sponsored publications and permitted limi-
tation of restraints on corporal punishment. 68 "For their own
good," students continually surrendered privacy, whether for
hearing or scoliosis screening or dental and dermatological
checks.169 Vernonia's bottom line was that Fourth Amendment
rights were simply "different in public schools than
elsewhere."170
Vernonia, in examining urinalysis-the "nature of intrusion
that is complained of"-found the conditions under which the
samples were taken to be "nearly identical to those typically en-
comments during the arguments. 'It's a very sensitive age for a girl. I didn't
think that my colleagues, some of them, quite understood."' Id.
163 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657.
164 Id. at 654.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 655.
168 Id. at 656.
169 Id. at 656.
170 Id.
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countered in public restrooms, which men, women, and school
children use daily."'71 Likening the tests to "routine school
physicals and vaccinations,"' 17 2 Justice Scalia thus trivialized the
privacy interests implicated by them as "negligible.' '173
Earls was equally dismissive of students' privacy concerns. In-
deed, Justice Thomas seemed less than certain that any privacy
interest was even implicated, for he described the drug test in-
trusion as only "allegedly compromis[ing]" privacy interests.1 74
Echoing Vernonia, Earls noted it was assessing privacy in the
context of children who were subjects "committed to the tempo-
rary custody of the State."1 75 The need to secure "order in the
school environment" required that "students be subjected to
greater controls than those appropriate for adults," thus limiting
the student's privacy interest.176
As for the drug test itself, Justice Thomas conceded that,
"[u]rination is 'an execratory function traditionally shielded by
great privacy." ' 177 The Court determined, however, that the
urinalysis in Earls was "virtually identical" to the one found to
cause merely a "negligible intrusion" in Vernonia.178 The inva-
sion on students' privacy was again "not significant.' 79
2. Safford Pursued a Genuine Assessment of the
Government Interests, Rather than Accepting
Unsupported Conclusions Outright.
The Safford Court more closely scrutinized the government's
contentions about the need to search than it had in prior case
171 Id. at 658.
172 Id. at 658, n. 2.
173 Id. at 658.
174 Earls, 536 U.S. at 830 (emphasis added).
175 Id.
176 Id. at 831.
177 Id. at 2566.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 832.
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law. Specifically, Justice Souter considered the particular danger
the school faced in Savana possessing ibuprofen and
naproxen.180 He assessed both the nature of the drugs ("com-
mon pain relievers") as well as the quantity of the substances
("equivalent to two Advil, or one Aleve"). 18 Although recog-
nizing that "just about anything can be taken in quantities that
will do real harm," Safford weighed the actual probability of
such large doses being involved in the case, noting, "Wilson had
no reason to suspect that large amounts of the drugs were being
passed around, or that individual students were receiving great
numbers of pills."' 182
Safford also examined whether the government's interests
would support an intrusion as severe as a strip search. Justice
Souter noted that such "categorically extreme intrusiveness of a
search down to the body of an adolescent requires some justifi-
cation in suspected facts."'183 He concluded that "nondangerous
school contraband does not raise the specter of stashes in inti-
mate places," and the record offered no evidence of such a gen-
eral practice.18 When, instead of facts, the government offered,
as "a truth universally acknowledged," that students hide con-
traband under their clothes, Safford explicitly rejected any such
justification based only on "general background possibilities" as
falling short. 8 5
Safford's critical assessment of government assertions about
its interests contrasted sharply with prior student search cases.
In Vernonia, the Court considered the nature of the government
concern in the broadest terms, casting the stakes as involving the
deterrence of "drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren."'' 86 The
school's side of the balance was therefore as important as
180 Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2642.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661.
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preventing the importation of drugs into the nation and deter-
ring drug use by "engineers and trainmen."187 Government in-
terest in train safety, in turn, had been seen by the Court as on a
par with that of nuclear power facilities. 18 8 Thus, when presented
with drug use at a high school, rather than assessing the particu-
lar danger posed by the individual student at a grade school, 8
9
Vernonia leapt to the national drug problem, a concern equated
with nuclear safety.
The Court followed Vernonia's analysis in Earls, noting that
the "drug abuse problem among our Nation's youth has hardly
abated since Vernonia [and] has only grown worse."' 190 Continu-
ing to frame the government interests on a national scale, Earls
intoned, "The nationwide drug epidemic makes the war against
drugs a pressing concern in every school."' 191 Earls offered statis-
tics for 12th graders in general, quoting a federal report indicat-
ing that "the number of 12th graders using any illicit drug
increased from 48.4 percent in 1995 to 53.9 percent in 2001."192
Earls was unfazed by the contention that no "real and immedi-
ate interest" existed to justify the drug testing policy, declaring,
"A demonstrated problem of drug abuse. . . [is] not in all cases
necessary to the validity of a testing regime."' 193
B. The Dramatic Change in the Court's Special Needs
Analysis Contrasted Sharply with Justice Thomas's
Consistent Special Needs Approach in his Dissent.
The significance of the Court's changing interpretation of spe-
cial needs was recognized by Justice Thomas, the only member
of the Court who apparently failed to get the memo about the
187 Id.
188 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628.
189 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 651.
190 Earls, 536 U.S. at 834.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 834, n.5.
193 Id. at 835.
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new direction. He reminded the Court of its previous focus on a
search's context, citing Vernonia to note that "the 'reasonable-
ness' inquiry cannot disregard the school's custodial and tutelary
responsibility for children."'194 He harkened back to the Court's
earlier worries that "[m]aintaining order in the classroom has
never been easy"'195 and further maintained that "in more recent
years, school disorder has taken particularly ugly forms: drug
use and violent crime in the schools have become major social
problems."' 96
Moreover, Justice Thomas viewed student privacy interests in
the tradition established by Vernonia and Earls. First he at-
tempted, however feebly, to minimize the privacy intrusion by
taking issue with the majority's description of what happened to
Savana as a "strip search."'197 Justice Thomas instead would have
reserved "the term 'strip search' for a search that required its
subject to fully disrobe in view of officials."' 198 Under this defini-
tion, the fact that Savana only pulled out and shook her bra and
underpants rather than completely removing them prevented
her from suffering an actual strip search. Justice Thomas pre-
ferred descriptions of strip searches that included mention of
"inspection of the rectal area" or "inspection of body cavi-
ties."'199 Since Romero and Schwallier failed to perform a cavity
search, Justice Thomas would conclude that Savana was techni-
cally spared a strip search.
Justice Thomas aimed to shrink students' Fourth Amendment
privacy interests still further by calling for "the complete resto-
ration" of in loco parentis,2°° the doctrine approvingly men-
194 Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2646 (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting);
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656.
195 Id. at 2646, citing T.L.O. 469 U.S. at 339.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 2649, n. 2.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 2655.
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tioned in Vernonia201 and alluded to in Earls.2°2 In the "early
years of public schooling," noted Justice Thomas, "courts ap-
plied the doctrine of in loco parentis to transfer to teachers the
authority of a parent to 'command obedience, to control stub-
bornness, to quicken diligence, and to reform bad habits.' 203
Justice Thomas speculated, "If the common-law view that par-
ents delegate to teachers their authority to discipline and main-
tain order were to be applied in this case, the search of Redding
would stand" because "there would be no doubt that a parent
would have had the authority to conduct the search at issue in
this case."204
Justice Thomas also followed the well-trodden path of
Vernonia and Earls when assessing the government interests im-
plicated in the case. Instead of considering the danger posed by
Savana having ibuprofen or naproxen in her underpants, Justice
Thomas adhered to the Court's prior framing of government
concerns in terms of the entire country, noting, "Teenage abuse
of over-the-counter and prescription drugs poses an increasingly
alarming national crisis." 205 Again, looking to the nation as a
whole, Justice Thomas warned, "more young people ages 12-17
abuse prescription drugs than any illicit drug except mari-
juana-more than cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine com-
bined."206 Consistent with his reasoning in Earls, Justice Thomas
again cited the Department of Health and Human Services, not-
ing that nationally, "[i]n 2008, 15.4 percent of 12th graders re-
ported using a prescription drug nonmedically within the past
year." 207 The countrywide scope enabled Justice Thomas to con-
201 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654.
202 In Earls, the Court considered its "most significant element" to be the
fact that the public school acted "as guardian and tutor of children entrusted
to its care." Earls, 536 U.S. at 830.
203 Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2655 (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting).
204 Id. at 2656.
205 Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2653.
206 Id.
207 Id.
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clude, "The risks posed by the abuse of these drugs are every bit
as serious as the dangers of using typical street drugs."20 8 The
big-picture consideration of government interests caused Justice
Thomas to oversell his case. He offered, "In 2002, abuse of con-
trolled prescription drugs was implicated in at least 23 percent
of drug-related emergency department admissions and 20.4 per-
cent of all single drug-related emergency department deaths." 20 9
The size of such numbers would probably decrease dramatically,
though, if the drugs involved were limited to only ibuprofen and
naproxen. Justice Thomas himself admitted as much by ac-
knowledging that the "Ibuprofen and Naproxen at issue in this
case are not the prescription painkillers at the forefront of the
prescription-drug-abuse problem."210 Rather, "Vicodin and Ox-
yContin are the prescription drugs most commonly abused by
teens."211 Thus, national concerns about powerful prescription
drugs being abused by some students were used to justify a strip
search of a particular adolescent for "run-of-the-mill anti-in-
flammatory pills."212
Even when Justice Thomas focused on the middle school in
particular, he tended to keep the scale of his analysis larger than
that of Savana's actions. To support reasonable grounds for sus-
pecting Savana of possessing pills, he noted initially that a few
years earlier, a student at the school had become "seriously ill"
due to ingesting prescription medication obtained from a fellow
classmate.213 Thus, the middle school "had a history of problems
with students using and distributing prohibited and illegal sub-
stances on campus. '214 At a school dance, alcohol and cigarettes
had been found in the girls' bathroom and a "group of stu-
208 Id.
209 Id. at 2654.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Redding, 531 F.3d at 1086.
213 Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2647-48.
214 Id. at 2648.
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dents," which included Savana, had smelled of alcohol. 215 An-
other student, Jordan Romero, had become violent and ill due
to ingestion of pills he had received from a classmate. 216 Further,
"certain students were bringing drugs and weapons on campus,"
others were "planning on taking the pills at lunch," and Marissa
Glines had given Jordan a white pill.2 17 Moreover, Justice
Thomas opined, "Redding would not have been the first person
to conceal pills in her undergarments." 218 Very little of this infor-
mation involved action taken by Savana herself; basically, be-
cause a student was sent to the ICU some years ago, Jordan
became violent and suffered a stomach ache at home, some stu-
dents had brought contraband on campus, and Marisa handed
Jordan a pill, school officials were allowed to look into Savana's
underwear. Justice Thomas thus thought in terms of group guilt,
or as he termed it, "general background possibilities." 219 Since
some of Savana's fellow classmates suffered problems with
drugs and since people in places as far away from Arizona as
Memphis, Fort Wayne and Vero Beach had stored contraband in
their underwear, a strip search of this schoolchild upon Marissa
Gline's accusation was reasonable. 220
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 2650.
219 Id.
220 For support of his assertion that "Redding would not have been the first
person to conceal pills in her undergarments," Justice Thomas offered the
following articles:
Hicks, Man Gets 17-Year Drug Sentence [Corbin, KY]
Times-Tribune, Oct. 7, 2008, p. 1 (Drug courier "told officials
she had the [Oxycontin] pills concealed in her crotch"); Conley,
Whitehaven: Traffic Stop Yields Hydrocodone Pills, [Mem-
phis] Commercial Appeal, Aug. 3, 2007, p. B3 ("An additional
40 hydrocodone pills were found in her pants"); Caywood, Po-
lice Vehicle Chase Leads to Drug Arrests, [Worcester] Tele-
gram & Gazette, June 7, 2008, p. A7 (25-year-old "allegedly
had a cigar tube stuffed with pills tucked into the waistband of
his pants"); Hubbart, 23-Year-Old Charged With Dealing Ec-
stasy. The [Fort Wayne] Journal Gazette, Aug. 8, 2007, p. C2
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C. Given Safford's Striking Change in Direction, Questions
Arise As to How Lasting the Court's Alteration of
Special Needs Will Be.
Safford presented schoolchildren with their first victory after
three increasingly resounding defeats. This dramatic switch in
course raises a question about the endurance of Safford's inter-
pretation of special needs doctrine. The Court's own opinion of-
fered indications that its reform of special needs balancing might
be fleeting. True, by one measure, the Court seemed to have
signaled a genuine change in attitude toward the Fourth
Amendment fundamental, individualized suspicion. In stark
contrast to the opening in Earls,221 the Court's most recent pre-
cedent, Safford highlighted probable cause as the general re-
quirement in Fourth Amendment analysis. 222 The Court
troubled to define probable cause, consider its constituent parts
and distinguish it from the other Fourth Amendment standard,
reasonable suspicion.223 Safford even resurrected language from
Aguillar v. Texas224 and Spinelli v. United States,22 5 cases creating
such a rigorous probable cause test that the Court subsequently
limited them in the seminal case, Illinois v. Gates.226 Safford's
emphasis of probable cause might signify little, however, since it
was not the standard ultimately used in the case.227 The very fact
that probable cause was not part of the holding reduces it to
("While he was being put into a squad car, his pants fell down
and a plastic bag containing pink and orange pills fell on the
ground"); Sebastian Residents Arrested in Drug Sting, Vero
Beach Press Journal, Sept. 16, 2006, p. B2 (Arrestee "told them
he had more pills 'down my pants"'). Id.
221 The Court in Earls marginalized probable cause as "peculiarly related to
criminal investigations." Earls, 536 U.S. at 828.
222 Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2639.
223 Id.
224 Aguillar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
225 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
226 Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2639; Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
227 Safford applied the "reasonable suspicion" standard to the case. Id. at
2643.
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nothing more than dicta, undermining its precedential value.
Thus, Safford's enthusiastic discussion of probable cause might
not signal any great prospect of lasting change in special needs
litigation.
Moreover, the Court's first condemnation of a school search
was further limited by Safford's own language. The Court's
change from upholding government searches in Vernonia and
Earls to its forbidding them in Safford might hinge on the single
fact that Safford involved a strip search. Appalled by the pros-
pect that school officials undressed a 13-year-old girl, Safford
stumbled over itself in finding ways to describe the severity of
the intrusion Savana suffered. Justice Souter deemed the search
"categorically distinct," 228 "categorically extreme"22 9 and "in a
category of its own demanding its own specific suspicions. 230
This very language could marginalize the case as one limited to
only strip searches, offering no insight on any other intrusions
school officials might pursue. Safford might therefore represent
little change in special needs precedent.
Ironically, the most serious attack on the usual approach to
special needs searches of schoolchildren came from an unex-
pected quarter-Justice Thomas. Irked by the Court's dismissal
of the dangers posed by over-the-counter and prescription
drugs,231 Justice Thomas took the Court to task for departing
from a "basic principle of the Fourth Amendment: that law en-
forcement officials can enforce with the same vigor all rules and
regulations irrespective of the perceived importance of any of
those rules."232 Perhaps self-conscious about supporting the dis-
robing of a thirteen-year-old for anti-inflammatories, Justice
Thomas defensively declared that officers were "entitled to
228 Id. at 2641.
229 Id. at 2642.
230 Id. at 2643.
231 The Court had commented on what it saw as the "limited threat of the
specific drugs" that were the target of the search. Id. at 2650.
232 Id. at 2651.
Volume 5, Number 2
.Spring 2012
31
Dery: "In a Category of Its Own": The Supreme Court in Safford v. Reddi
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
search regardless of the perceived triviality of the underlying
law."233 Since school officials watched over "a large number of
students who are inclined to test the outer boundaries of accept-
able conduct and to imitate the misbehavior of a peer if that
misbehavior is not dealt with quickly," even "something as sim-
ple as a water pistol or a peashooter can wreak [havoc] until it is
taken away." 234 If schools were threatened by water pistols and
peashooters, the "unchecked distribution and consumption of
prescription pills by students certainly needs no elaboration." 235
The equating of pills to water pistols hardly helped Justice
Thomas's argument; the implication of his logic is that the
Fourth Amendment would support strip searches for
peashooters.
Seemingly unconvinced by his own argument, Justice Thomas
contended that possession of over-the-counter drugs and pre-
scription drugs was anything but trivial; in fact, it was criminal.
He noted that "[i]t is a crime to possess or use prescription-
strength Ibuprofen without a prescription."236 He then went on
to quote Arizona's criminal statute: "A person shall not know-
ingly... [p]ossess or use a prescription-only drug unless the per-
son obtains the prescription-only drug pursuant to a valid
prescription."237 He concluded:
By prohibiting unauthorized prescription drugs on school
grounds-and conducting a search to ensure students abide by
that prohibition-the school rule here was consistent with a rou-
tine provision of the state criminal code. It hardly seems unrea-
sonable for school officials to enforce a rule that, in effect,
proscribes conduct that amounts to a crime.238
233 Id.
234 Id. at 2652.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 2653.
238 Id.
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This line of reasoning led Justice Thomas onto some very thin
ice. If school officials are doing nothing more than forbidding
conduct that amounts to a crime, then they are in the crime
fighting business. If, pursuant to the goal of stopping crime, the
school performs a search to recover criminal evidence, it does
not differ from the police. The school thus has lost the entire
"special needs" rationale that enabled it to act without probable
cause, and, for that matter, a warrant, in the first place. In
T.L.O., the case that first applied special needs doctrine to stu-
dents, Justice Blackmun carefully explained that special needs
balancing was permitted, "rather than strictly applying the
Fourth Amendment's Warrant and Probable-Cause Clause, only
when we were confronted with a special law enforcement need
for greater flexibility. " 239 Vernonia explicitly noted, "Where a
search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover ev-
idence of criminal wrongdoing, this Court has said that reasona-
bleness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant."240
Even Earls acknowledged the need for probable cause in crimi-
nal investigations.241 The prospect of Justice Thomas applying
special needs analysis to criminal cases, thus freeing officials
from the warrant and probable cause mandates in the Fourth
Amendment's last bastion of traditional protections, will under-
mine the special quality of special needs.
Even more daunting was Justice Thomas's view of the scope
of searches permitted by special needs doctrine. In this regard,
he voiced frustration that the Safford Court refused to "grant
[the] considerable leeway to school officials" that it had in prior
cases. 242 He viewed the school system as involving a struggle for
power; school teachers needed to be "empowered" with "almost
complete discretion to establish and enforce rules.. .to maintain
239 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
240 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653.
241 Earls, 536 U.S. at 828.
242 Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2649.
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control over their classrooms." 243 Justice Thomas favored the in
loco parentis doctrine because it would invest teachers and ad-
ministrators with parental "immunity from the strictures of the
Fourth Amendment" when searching children.244 By finding
Savana's strip search unreasonable, "the majority ha[d] sur-
rend[ed] control of the American public school system to public
school students." 245 Because he viewed education in public
schools as a contest for power, Justice Thomas endorsed alarm-
ingly broad government search rights. He declared that, since
"school officials searched in a location where the pills could
have been hidden, the search was reasonable in scope under
T.L.O."246 To remove any doubt about his test, Justice Thomas
repeated his physical-ability-to-hide criterion by declaring,
"Reasonable suspicion that Redding was in possession of drugs
in violation of school policies, therefore, justified a search ex-
tending to any area where small pills could be concealed." 247
The force of Justice Thomas's logic, particularly in light of the
power dynamics he believed existed at schools, would seem to
permit body cavity searches of students. Such a concern is rein-
forced by Justice Thomas's perception of students as opportun-
ists; he saw the Court's ruling in Safford as an
"announce[ment]" to schoolchildren about "the safest place to
secrete contraband in school." 248 By woefully predicting that
Savana would "not be the last" to conceal pills in her undergar-
ments, he seemed to foresee an epidemic of pills in pants,249 a
worry made all the more curious in light of the fact that no pills
were ever found in Savana's underwear in the first place.
Perhaps watching Justice Thomas's slide down the slippery
slope proved to be too much for the Court in Safford. Whether
243 Id. at 2655.
244 Id. at 2656.
245 Id. at 2655.
246 Id. at 2649.
247 Id. at 2655.
248 Id. at 2650.
249 Id.
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it was his blurring of special needs justifications with criminal
law enforcement interests, his logic that would enable body cav-
ity searches for any item deemed by school officials to be con-
traband, or his apocalyptic view of our educational system,
Justice Thomas's arguments seemed to have caused the rest of
the Court to draw back from special needs' brink. Concerns
about the logical extremes of special needs balancing might
make Safford have a more enduring impact on the Fourth
Amendment rights of schoolchildren.
Yet, Safford's admirable caution in avoiding special needs'
logical extremes had little impact on the Court's recent case in-
volving strip searches, Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders,
in which the Court upheld suspicion-less strip searches of in-
mates entering the general population of jails.250 Florence
deemed strip searches to be reasonable even though the jail's
intrusions were clearly more severe than those in Safford.251 Flo-
rence recognized that the term, "strip search," was hardly pre-
cise, noting that:
It may refer simply to the intrusion to remove clothing while
an officer observes from a distance of, say, five feet or more; it
may mean a visual inspection from a closer, more uncomforta-
ble distance; it may include directing detainees to shake their
heads or to run their hands through their hair to dislodge what
might be hidden there; or it may involve instructions to raise
arms, to display foot insteps, to expose the back of the ears, to
move or spread the buttocks or genital areas, or to cough in a
squatting position.252
Still, Florence's discussion of spreading the buttocks or moving
the genitals offered a more alarming picture than that of a per-
son pulling out and shaking her bra.253
250 Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 132 S.
Ct. 1510, 1514, 1523 (2012).
251 Id. at 1515.
252 Id.
253 Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2638.
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The government's concerns in the balance of interests, how-
ever, were also greater in Florence, for, despite Justice Thomas'
"ugly" vision of schools as plagued by drug use and violent
crime, maintenance of order in jails and prisons present a much
greater challenge to officials than misbehaving schoolchildren.254
In jails, arrestees have been known to conceal "knives, scissors,
razor blades, glass shards, and other prohibited items on their
person, including in their body cavities."2 55 In such "crowded,
unsanitary, and dangerous places" as jails, it could be argued
that government needs greater search powers than in schools.256
Perhaps more troubling for the long-term prospects of Safford
than Florence's conclusion were the rationales in support of its
holding. Although Florence paid lip service to balancing the
need to search against the "resulting invasion of personal
rights," one searches the majority opinion in vain for any serious
consideration of the intrusion strip searches place upon the pri-
vacy and dignity of the individual.257 The Court in Florence has
forgotten Safford's lesson that privacy interests must be realisti-
cally weighed rather than minimized. 258 Indeed, the explicit ref-
erence in Florence's dissent to Safford's declaration that a strip
search is so degrading that it is "in a category of its own de-
manding its own specific suspicions," seemingly fell on deaf
ears.
259
Further, the Court in Florence uncritically accepted the gov-
ernment's assertions regarding its interests in performing strip
searches of all arrestees, priding itself on the deference it
showed "to the judgment of correctional officials." 260 As noted
by the dissent, Florence failed to critically assess whether the
official invasion of interests was "reasonably related" to the gov-
254 Id. at 2646 (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting).
255 Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1519.
256 Id. at 1520.
257 Id. at 1516.
258 Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2642, 2644.
259 Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1526 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
260 Id. at 1513-14.
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ernment's penological interests.2 6 1 Such blanket acceptance of
government interests ignored Safford, returning the Court to the
earlier days of special needs.262 Florence, of course, took place in
a context quite different from Savana's school. Still, the fact that
Florence fell back into the old bad habits of earlier special needs
litigation might not bode well for Safford's potential to protect
schoolchildren from intrusions in the future.
V. CONCLUSION.
When the Court in T.L.O. abandoned the probable cause
standard for school searches of student possessions, it trusted
that the new test would "neither unduly burden the efforts of
school authorities to maintain order in their schools nor author-
ize unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy of school chil-
dren."2 63 The Court took comfort in believing that its
"reasonableness standard" would "ensure that the interests of
students will be invaded no more than is necessary to achieve
the legitimate end of preserving order in the schools." 264 Less
than twenty five years later, the Court found itself confronted
with two school officials strip searching a 13-year-old girl for
"run-of-the-mill anti-inflammatory pills." 265
This leap, of course, did not occur in a vacuum. School offi-
cials have taken to heart the Court's warnings of a "nationwide
epidemic of drug use" 266 and of "the importance of the govern-
mental concern in preventing drug use by schoolchildren. '" 267
The Court has described drugs in schools in the starkest terms,
speaking of "an immediate crisis" and a "state of rebellion." 268
261 Id. at 1528 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
262 Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2642.
263 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342-43.
264 Id. at 343.
265 Redding, 531 F.3d at 1086.
266 Earls, 536 U.S. at 836.
267 Id. at 834.
268 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663.
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The Court has not minced words about the schools' enormous
responsibilities toward those in their charge, asserting that "the
necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact that this
evil is being visited not just upon individuals at large, but upon
children for whom it has undertaken a special responsibility of
care and direction." 269270 School officials have learned that they
are caring for an especially vulnerable class of persons, declar-
ing, "We know all too well that drug use carries a variety of
health risks for children, including death from overdose." 271 The
Court has detailed the dangers, warning that "[s]chool years are
the time when the physical, psychological, and addictive effects
of drugs are most severe,"272 and even describing "irregular
blood pressure," "reduction in the oxygen carrying-capacity of
the blood," and of "possible artery spasms and myocardial
infarction." 273
Decades of such dire judicial declarations, combined with the
Court's continual erosion of children's privacy interests in
school, has robbed school officials of any perspective. The Court
has placed teachers and administrators, "in every school," on
the front lines of "the war against drugs."2 74 In this war, the
weapon of special needs has been employed without restraint,
and one of the casualties has been reason itself.
269 Earls, 536 U.S. at 834.
270 Florence echoed this focus on government responsibility to preserve the
safety of persons by noting, "Detecting contraband concealed by new detain-
ees, furthermore, is a most serious responsibility." Florence, 132 S. Ct. at
1519. Florence urged that the government's obligation to preserve safety was
in the individual's interest as well, because the searches in question were
meant to guard against "danger to everyone in the facility, including the less
serious offenders themselves." Id. at 1522.
271 Earls, 536 U.S. at 836-837.
272 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661.
273 Id. at 662.
274 Earls, 536 U.S. at 834.
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